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I. INTRODUCTION
Many of the limitations on state power created by the Constitution
are expressly stated in its text. Most prominent among these restrictions
is Article I, Section 10, which prohibits, among other things, the States
from coining their own money, entering into any treaty, alliance, or con-
federation, or passing any law impairing the obligation of contracts.' It
has been manifest that in these areas the States do not have the autority
to regulate. A much more difficult scenario arises, however, where the
Constitution endows the federal government with the ability to legislate
but is silent concerning the States' right to take action. Perhaps the most
controversial of these silent regions is the "negative," or "dormant"
aspect of the Commerce Clause. The clause itself declares that "Con-
gress shall have the Power ... [t]o regulate Commerce with foreign
Nations, and among the several States, and with Indian Tribes."2 This
power has served two functions under Supreme Court jurisprudence: (1)
1. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 1. This clause provides that "[n]o State shall enter into any
Treaty, Alliance, or Confederation; grant Letters of Marque and Reprisal; coin Money; emit Bills
of Credit; make any Thing but gold and silver Coin a Tender in Payment of Debts; pass any Bill of
Attainder, ex post facto Law, or Law impairing the Obligation of Contracts, or grant any Title of
Nobility."
2. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
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as a seemingly limitless source of congressional authority to enact legis-
lation,3 and (2) as a questionable latent restriction upon the ability of the
States to create laws that have an effect on interstate commerce.4 While
the ability of Congress to use the Commerce Clause to regulate is fairly
well-settled, the Dormant Commerce Clause has been described by the
Supreme Court itself as a "morass."5 Much of the incertitude that sur-
rounds the doctrine can be attributed to the fact that it is found nowhere
within the Constitution; it is a judicial exegesis.6 Unconstrained by text,
the Dormant Commerce Clause has been used to nullify a wide, seem-
ingly unrelated variety of state initiatives, including waste management,7
vehicle length restrictions,8 milk processing,9 and most recently, in
Camps Newfound/Owatonna, Inc. v. Town of Harrison, Maine, a tax
exemption for charities that serve mostly state residents.' °
On its face the holding in Camps Newfound/Owatonna is
unremarkable, as the Court has previously held that discriminatory tax
exemptions are repugnant to the Commerce Clause." What is interest-
ing, however, is the Dissent's suggestion that perhaps a "Domestic Char-
ity" exception to the Dormant Commerce Clause should be created,' 2
along the lines of the Court's "Market Participant" jurisprudence.1 3 It
would allow a State to provide "social welfare to only (or principally) its
own residents - [regardless of] whether it be accomplished directly or
3. See, e.g., Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111 (1942) (upheld Agricultural Adjustment Act
of 1938, which set quotas on wheat to be consumed at the same farm on which it was grown,
under a "cumulative effect" theory). But see U.S. v. Lopez, 115 S. Ct. 1624 (1995) (invalidated
Gun-Free School Zones Act of 1990 because it did not have a "substantial" effect on interstate
commerce), which seems to indicate that some limitations do still exist.
4. See, e.g., West Lynn Creamery, Inc. v. Healy, 114 S. Ct. 2205 (1994) (invalidated a state
tax and subsidy because the two in combination benefited in-state milk producers at the expense
of their out-of-state counterparts); Hunt v. Washington State Apple Advertising Commission, 432
U.S. 333 (1977) (invalidated a North Carolina statute requiring all closed containers of apples
shipped or sold in the State to bear the U.S. grade or no grade at all on the grounds that the burden
on interstate commerce far outweighed the statutes limited benefit to North Carolina consumers).
5. Camps Newfound/Owatonna, Inc. v. Town of Harrison, Maine, 117 S. Ct. 1590, 1615
(1997) (Thomas, J., joined by Rehnquist, C.J. and Scalia, J., dissenting).
6. See, e.g., Quill Corp. v. North Dakota, 504 U.S. 298, 309 (1992) (noting that the
Commerce Clause "says nothing about the protection of interstate commerce in the absence of any
action by Congress").
7. See City of Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617 (1978); C & A Carbone v.
Clarkstown, 511 U.S. 383 (1994).
8. See Kassel v. Consolidated Freightways Corp., 450 U.S. 662 (1981).
9. See Dean Milk Co. v. City of Madison, 340 U.S. 349 (1951).
10. 117 S. Ct. 1590 (1997).
11. See Bacchus Imports, Ltd. v. Dias, 468 U.S. 263 (1984) (invalidating a discriminatory
state liquor tax).
12. Camps Newfound/Owatonna, Inc. v. Town of Harrison, Maine, 117 S. Ct. 1590, 1612-13
(1997) (Scalia, J., joined by Rehnquist, C.J., Ginsburg, J. and Thomas, J., dissenting).
13. See, e.g., Reeves, Inc. v. Stake, 447 U.S. 429 (1980).
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by providing tax exemptions, cash or other property to private organiza-
tions that perform the work for the State."' 4 The purpose of this article is
to examine the feasibility of such an exception. Providing welfare bene-
fits does not appear to have anything to do with the economic protec-
tionism the Framers of the Constitution were so wary of, 5 but it is
questionable whether that fact alone justifies the creation of yet another
wrinkle to an already confused doctrine.
The article consists of five (5) sections. Part I will briefly discuss
the origins of the Dormant Commerce Clause - from the problems cre-
ated by the lack of a commerce power under the Articles of Confedera-
tion to the landmark opinions of Gibbons v. Ogden 6 and Willson v.
Black Bird Creek Marsh Co. 7 Next, Part II will attempt to make some
sense of the modem Court's Dormant Commerce Clause principles and
allow the reader to get the current "lay of the land." Part III addresses
why the doctrine's relatively clear tenets rarely result in lucid decisions,
while Part IV introduces the troubling Camps NewfoundlOwatonna18
decision itself. Finally, Part V explores the plausibility of creating a
"Domestic Charity" exception, examining whether such an exclusion
would violate the three modem theories that purportedly support Dor-
mant Commerce Clause jurisprudence and what class of activities might
fall within its parameters.
A. Revolutionary Economic Warfare
The navigation laws and commercial restrictions forced by Great
Britain upon the Colonies contributed mightily to the sense of alienation
that led to the American Revolution. 9 British legislation such as the
Currency Act of 1764, which prohibited the Colonies from issuing paper
money, hindered commercial activity and led to angry, and sometimes
violent, condemnation.20 Once the nationalist outburst of the Revolution
began to subside, however, the new States seemingly forgot the animos-
14. Camps NewfoundlOwatonna, Inc., 117 S. Ct. at 1614 (Scalia, J., joined by Rehnquist,
C.J., Ginsburg, J. and Thomas, J., dissenting).
15. See Richard B. Collins, Economic Union as a Constitutional Value, 63 N.Y.U. L. REv.
43, 53 (1988).
16. 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1 (1824).
17. 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) 245 (1829).
18. 117 S. Ct. 1590 (1997).
19. See NATHANIEL C. TOWLE, A HISTORY AND ANALYSIS OF THE CONsTrrrION OF THE
UNITED STATES 108 (Fred B. Rothman & Co. 3rd ed. 1987).
20. See COLIN BONWICK, THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION 71 (University Press of Virginia,
1991). Clashes between the British soldiers and civilians became increasingly common following
the creation of a new ministry by George Grenville in 1763. One of Grenville's main objectives
was to strengthen the trade legislation of the Colonies and to raise greater revenue for their
defense. Legislation such as the Currency Act and the Stamp Act of 1765 was created to further
such goals, but the Colonies protested that such legislation was an unwarranted extension of
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ity that was created by the English commercial restrictions. "When vic-
tory relieved the Colonies from the pressure for solidarity that war had
exerted, a drift toward anarchy and commercial warfare between states
began."'" "No longer subject to the navigation laws of the British Par-
liament, which . . . brought . . . uniformity among the colonial ports;
each of the new-born States was left in perfect liberty to adopt such
regulations as appeared conducive to its individual interests, regardless
of the consequences upon its neighbors. '"2
Explanations for such self-serving behavior abound. Some com-
mentators believe it was primarily the result of losing Great Britain as a
trading partner - the decrease in the size of the market compelling the
States to implement protective measures for the benefit of in-state pro-
ducers.23 Other observers contend that these restrictions arose because
even as colonies the States were envious and obstinate, and the Revolu-
tionary War had only temporarily displaced the centrifugal forces
originating from their diversity. z4 Whatever the inspiration was for such
revenue generating measures, the ability to enact them was closely
guarded by the States, and as a result the Articles of Confederation con-
tained no tax or commerce powers.25
The continued inability of the federal government to regulate com-
merce allowed the States to persist in discriminating against one another
in commercial trade. States that possessed the established ports through
which trade with the British had formerly been conducted began to exact
tax revenue from those States less favorably situated. 6 James Madison
compared New Jersey, trapped between the ports of New York and Phil-
adelphia, "to a cask tapped at both ends."127 Even when the federal gov-
ernment did attempt to step in, it was usually an act of futility. "The
states flouted their constitutional obligations. The Articles obliged the
states to 'abide by the determinations of the United States, in Congress
assembled,' but there was no way to force the states to comply. 2 8
One of the major objectives of the Constitutional Convention was
the prevention of further such economic warfare. According to Richard
parliamentary power in America. These protests sometimes turned violent, the most notorious
example being the March 5, 1770, Boston Massacre. Id. at 71-72, 75.
21. Hood & Sons v. DuMond, 336 U.S. 525, 533 (1949).
22. TOWLE, supra note 19, at 108.
23. See JOHN E. NOWAK ET AL., CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 144-145 (West Publishing, 2nd ed.
1983).
24. See LEONARD W. LEVY & DENNIS J. MAHONEY, THE FRAMING AND RATIFICATION OF THE
CONSTITUTION 6 (MacMillan Publishing Company, 1987).
25. See TOWLE, supra note 19, at 109; LEVY & MAHONEY, supra note 24, at 6.
26. See TOWLE, supra note 19, at 108.
27. See LEVY & MAHONEY, supra note 24, at 7-8.
28. Id. at 6.
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Collins, "[i]nterstate rivalry was the Convention's greatest concern.""
Alexander Hamilton, in his summary of the Annapolis meeting, stated
that the Constitutional Convention was necessary to "harmonize trade
relations."30 Edmund Randolph was reported by James Madison to have
cited "the federal government[' s] [inability to] check the quarrels
between states" as a deficiency of the Articles of Confederation which
needed to be corrected.3 In accordance with such considerations, sev-
eral restrictions on state power were implemented within the text of the
new Constitution. Among these were a prohibition on retroactive legisla-
tion, 32 emitting bills of credit,33 and imposing import duties for the pur-
pose of raising revenue.34 Also included was the Commerce Clause.
The text of the Commerce Clause clearly confers upon Congress
the ability to regulate; it is less certain, however, that the clause was
designed to act as a restriction upon the States.3 6 Some commentators
find such an intention to limit local legislative activity in the broad
nature of the Commerce Clause itself. For example, Robert Stem sug-
gests that "[t]he history and proceedings of the Convention ... indicate
that the purpose of the commerce clause was to give the Federal Govern-
ment as much control over commercial transactions as was and would in
the future be essential to the general welfare of the union."3 7 Con-
versely, other scholars have rejected such liberal constitutional interpre-
tations. Martin Redish and Shane Nugent have observed that it seems
rather unlikely the Founding Fathers would have created a prohibition
on state power in the form of a grant of power to the federal govern-
ment; the delegates could have simply expressed any intended restriction
in Article I, Section 10 of the Constitution along with other powers
denied to the States.38 The purpose of this article, however, is not to
29. See Collins, supra note 15, at 53.
30. See BROADUS MITCHELL & LOUISE PEARSON MITCHELL, A BIOGRAPHY OF THE
CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES: ITS ORIGIN, FORMATION, ADOPTION, INTERPRETATION 18
(Oxford University Press, 1964).
31. See James Madison, The Debates in the Federal Convention of 1787 Which Framed the
Constitution of the United States of America 23 (G. Hunt & J. Scott eds. 1987).
32. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 1.
33. Id.
34. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 2.
35. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
36. See Martin H. Redish & Shane V. Nugent, The Dormant Commerce Clause and the
Constitutional Balance of Federalism 4 DUKE L.J. 569 (1987) (arguing that there is no legitimate
constitutional source for the Dormant Commerce Clause).
37. Robert L. Stem, That Commerce Clause Which Concerns More States Than One, 47
HARV. L. REV. 1335, 1344-45 (1934). See also Donald Regan, The Supreme Court and State
Protectionism: Making Sense of the Dormant Commerce Clause, 84 MICH. L. REV. 1091, 1125
(1986) ("The framers wanted commerce among the states to be free of state-originated
mercantilist impositions").
38. See Redish & Nugent, supra note 36, at 586.
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enter into the intellectual fray concerning the legitimacy of the negative
doctrine as a whole. 39 Regardless of whether one feels the Dormant
Commerce Clause is a valid exercise of judicial authority or not, most
scholars agree that the rule will not be tossed on the jurisprudential scrap
heap anytime soon.4" A historical perspective is included merely to
illustrate that while there was plainly a need to restrict the commercial
activity of the States at the time the Constitution was written, it is far
from certain that the Commerce Clause was the vehicle chosen by the
Framers to accomplish this task. Such uncertainty has continued to
plague the modem Court, with several members sharing a belief that the
doctrine's restrictive objectives are properly accomplished through other
constitutional means.4 In light of such disparate perspectives, it is truly
remarkable that the negative aspect of the Commerce Clause was so
readily apparent to early Chief Justice John Marshall.
B. Initial Judicial Explications
The Supreme Court first addressed the power of the Commerce
Clause in the absence of congressional activity in the case of Gibbons v.
Ogden. 2 Gibbons involved an act of the New York legislature which
gave Robert Livingston and Robert Fulton the exclusive steamship navi-
gation rights to all the waters of the State.43 Livingston and Fulton later
assigned to Ogden the right to operate a steamship between New York
City and Elizabeth Point, New Jersey." Gibbons, a competing ferry
owner who already ran a service between the two cities, was enjoined by
the courts of New York from continuing to operate his ships due to the
grant possessed by Ogden.45 In response, Gibbons argued that the stat-
ute creating Ogden's monopoly was invalid because it was repugnant to
the Commerce Clause.46 Specifically, he contended that the federal
commerce power was exclusive and barred the New York legislature
39. For a good overview of the arguments for and against the continued existence of the
Dormant Commerce Clause, see Redish & Nugent, supra note 36 (argues Dormant Commerce
Clause is illegitimate), and Regan, supra note 37 (argues Dormant Commerce Clause is a valid
doctrine), respectively.
40. See, e.g., David S. Day, The Rehnquist Court and the Dormant Commerce Clause
Doctrine: The Potential Unsettling of the "Well-Settled Principles", 22 U. TOL. L. REv. 675, 715
(1991).
41. See Camps Newfound/Owatonna, Inc. v. Town of Harrison, Maine, 117 S. Ct. 1590, 1615
(1997) (Thomas, J., joined by Scalia, J., dissenting) (argues that the Article I, § 10 Import-Export
Clause creates an express check on the States' ability to impose discriminatory taxes on the
commerce of other states).
42. 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1 (1824).
43. See id. at 1-2.
44. See id. at 2.
45. See id.
46. See id. at 186.
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from regulating interstate commercial activities.47
Although this argument intrigued the Court, Chief Justice Marshall
did not dispositively address it in his opinion. Instead, he framed the
issue presented for review as whether "a State [can] regulate commerce
with foreign nations and among the States, while Congress is regulating
it?" 48 He found that the New York statute directly conflicted with a
1793 licensing law enacted by Congress, and that consequently the
monopoly granted by the State was invalid due to the Supremacy
Clause.49 From the standpoint of Dormant Commerce Clause jurispru-
dence, however, the crucial portion of the decision was Marshall's
examination in dicta of Ogden's exclusivity argument. The Chief Jus-
tice compared the federal power to tax, which he believed was concur-
rent, with the power to regulate commerce. After noting that "[i]n
imposing taxes for State purposes, [a State is] not doing what Congress
is empowered to do," Marshall went on to add that "when a State pro-
ceeds to regulate commerce with foreign nations, or among the several
States, it is exercising the very power that is granted to Congress, and is
doing the very thing which Congress is authorized to do."5° Such a
statement, although not critical to the decision itself, was the initial indi-
cation that the Court might limit the States' ability to regulate a field of
interstate commerce even when Congress had taken no action. Mar-
shall's interpretation of the Commerce Clause was taken one step further
by Justice Johnson in his concurrence; he believed that "[t]he power of a
sovereign state over commerce ...necessarily implies the power to
determine what shall remain unrestrained; it follows, that the power
must be exclusive. ' 1
While the dicta of the Gibbons decision began to lay down the phil-
osophical groundwork of the Dormant Commerce Clause, it was the
Willson v. Black Bird Creek Marsh Co.52 ruling that solidified the doc-
trine's existence as a possible limitation upon the commercial power of
the States. In Willson, the Black Bird Creek Marsh Company was
authorized by the State of Delaware to erect a dam across a creek which
connected with the Delaware River. 3 Willson and others, the owners of
a ship which regularly navigated the creek, broke through the dam and
were subsequently sued by the Black Bird Creek Marsh Company for
47. See id. at 198.
48. Id. at 200.
49. See id. at 221.
50. Id. at 199-200.
51. Id. at 227 (Johnson, J., concurring).
52. 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) 245 (1829).
53. See id. at 245-46.
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trespass. 54 The sailors defended their actions by arguing that the Dela-
ware statute which allowed the dam to be built was incongruous with the
Commerce Clause. 5 The Court rejected this contention, and in the pro-
cess explicitly acknowledged for the first time the existence of a latent
restriction upon the ability of the States to enact legislation that affects
interstate commerce. Chief Justice Marshall wrote: "[w]e do not think
that the act empowering the Black Bird Creek Marsh Company to place
a dam across the creek, can ... be considered as repugnant to the power
to regulate commerce in its dormant state."56 In reaching this conclu-
sion, the Court conducted the type of cost-benefit analysis that has since
become a hallmark of the Dormant Commerce Clause. It implicitly rea-
soned that the economic and health benefits of damming the creek out-
weighed the negligible effect on interstate navigation such activity
would have.57 Formally recognizing the negative aspect of the Com-
merce Clause has proven to be the easiest part of the Court's dormant
jurisprudence, however; it has spent the last 170 years attempting to jus-
tify and delimit Chief Justice Marshall's conception.
II. THE DORMANT COMMERCE CLAUSE TODAY
It is beyond the scope of this article to detail the innumerable twists
and turns in the development of the Dormant Commerce Clause since
Gibbons and Willson. 8 Nonetheless, a brief summary of the current
state of the doctrine is helpful in attempting to understand the difficulties
presented by the suggestion in Camps Newfound/Owatonna that another
exception to the precept be created.59 Justice Scalia presents a good
overview of dormant jurisprudence in his Camps Newfound/Owatonna
dissent,60 and his outline will form the backbone of the synopsis
presented here.
The first determination that the Court seems to make when it
encounters a state initiative that restricts interstate commerce is whether
the law is facially neutral or facially discriminatory. According to Scalia,
"where ... a state law is nondiscriminatory, but nonetheless adversely
affects interstate commerce, we employ a deferential 'balancing test,'
54. See id. at 246.
55. See id. at 251-52.
56. Id. at 252 (emphasis added).
57. See MICHAEL CONANT, THE CONSTITUTION AND THE ECONOMY 97-98 (University of
Oklahoma Press, 1991).
58. For such an explication, see GEOFFREY R. STONE ET AL., CONSTITUTIONAL LAw 289-93
(Little, Brown and Company, 3rd ed. 1996).
59. See 117 S. Ct. 1590, 1613 (1997) (Scalia, J., joined by Rehnquist, C.J., Ginsburg, J., and
Thomas, J., dissenting).
60. See id. at 1608-09.
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under which the law will be sustained unless 'the burden imposed on
[interstate] commerce is clearly excessive in relation to the putative local
benefits.' "61 On the other hand, "[w]here a state law facially discrimi-
nates against interstate commerce, we observe what has sometimes been
referred to as a 'virtually per se rule of invalidity.'"62
A good example of the facially neutral balancing test in action is
the Exxon Corp. v. Governor of Maryland decision,63 which scrutinized
a Maryland initiative that prohibited all producers and refiners of petro-
leum from operating retail service stations within that State.64 Exxon
argued that although the statute had a neutral facade, "the divestiture
requirements [impermissibly fell] solely on interstate companies"
because Maryland did not produce or refine any gasoline. 65 The Court
disagreed and held that the law did not violate the Dormant Commerce
Clause.66 Weighing the statute's burden on interstate commerce against
the legitimacy of the benefits it conferred locally, the Court found no
hindrance to national commercial interests at all, much less an undue
one. Noting that "the Clause protects the interstate market, not particular
interstate firms,"6 7 it reasoned that because all of Maryland's petroleum
would still come from out-of-state under the statute (now just from
independent dealers), there was no discrimination against interstate com-
merce. 68 Since no burden was present, an examination of the "putative
benefits" portion of the balancing test was deemed unnecessary,
although the Court believed the "[S]tate [did have a] legitimate purpose
in controlling the gasoline retail market. 69
The facially discriminatory mode of analysis was employed by the
Court in the case of Maine v. Taylor.7° There the State of Maine enacted
a statute which prohibited the importation of live baitfish, the primary
justification being that wild Maine fish would be at risk of contracting
61. Id. at 1608 (citing Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137, 147 (1970)).
62. Id., (emphasis in original).
63. 437 U.S. 117 (1978). See also Hunt v. Washington State Apple Advertising Commission,
432 U.S. 333, 352-53 (1977) ("Despite the statute's facial neutrality ... [w]hen discrimination
against commerce of the type we have found is demonstrated, the burden falls on the State to
justify it both in terms of the local benefits flowing from the statute and the unavailability of
nondiscriminatory alternatives adequate to preserve the local interests at stake").
64. See 437 U.S. at 119.
65. Id. at 125.
66. See id. at 133-34.
67. Id. at 127.
68. See id. at 125-26.
69. Id. at 125.
70. 477 U.S. 131 (1986). See also City of Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617, 628
(1978) ("On its face, [the New Jersey law] imposes on out-of-state commercial interests the full
burden of conserving the State's remaining landfill space").
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parasites from the foreign animals.7" The Court initially observed that
the law created a "restrict[ion] [on] interstate trade [of] the most direct
manner possible."7" Nonetheless, it held that because the limitations on
state power created by the Dormant Commerce Clause are not absolute,
there was still a possibility that the statute could be found constitu-
tional.7 3 For this to occur, Maine was required to satisfy the "strict scru-
tiny" test, under which the statute had to be proven to serve a legitimate
local purpose which could not be accomplished by less discriminatory
means.7" Remarkably, the State was able to make such a showing. The
Court believed that Maine had "a legitimate interest in guarding against
imperfectly understood environmental risks,"75 and further that because
there were no current sampling and inspection procedures in existence to
check baitfish for parasites, the "abstract possibility" of developing such
a test "[did] not make those procedures an '[a]vailabl[e] ... nondiscrim-
inatory alternativ[e]' for purposes of the commerce clause."76 It should
be noted, however, that this is the only case to date in which a facially
discriminatory statute has satisfied "strict scrutiny" muster.
Until fairly recently, the Court's analysis would end at this point;
the statute in question would either survive the facially discriminatory
strict scrutiny test or the facially neutral balancing test or be declared
constitutionally invalid. In Hughes v. Alexandria Scrap Corp. ,7 7 how-
ever, the so-called "Market Participant" exception was announced.78
According to Scalia, this exception "preserve[s] from judicial invalida-
tion laws that confer advantages upon the State's residents but do so
without regulating interstate commerce."79  The Court in Hughes
examined a Maryland statutory scheme aimed at ridding the State of
unsightly automobile hulks. The statute provided that Maryland would
pay a bounty to all scrap processors that destroyed abandoned vehicles,
but made it more difficult for out-of-state processors to collect the
money by imposing additional documentation requirements upon
them.80 The Alexandria Scrap Corporation complained that such
requirements "interfer[ed] with ...the flow of bounty-eligible hulks
71. See 477 U.S. at 140-41.
72. Id. at 137.
73. See id. at 138.
74. See id. at 138 (citations omitted).
75. Id. at 148.
76. Id. at 147 (alteration in original) (citation omitted).
77. 426 U.S. 794 (1976).
78. See id. at 810.
79. Camps Newfound/Owatonna, Inc. v. Town of Harrison, Maine, 117 S. Ct. 1590, 1609
(1997) (Scalia, J., joined by Rehnquist, C.J., Ginsburg, J., and Thomas, J., dissenting) (emphasis
in original).
80. See Hughes, 426 U.S. at 800-01.
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across state lines," and in doing so violated the Commerce Clause."'
The Court disagreed, noting that unlike in earlier cases where violations
had been found, Maryland was not interfering with the normal function-
ing of the interstate market.82 Instead, all the State was doing was
purchasing abandoned automobiles, and "[n]othing in the purposes ani-
mating the Commerce Clause prohibits a State, in the absence of con-
gressional action, from participating in the market and exercising the
right to favor its own citizens over others."83 This "Market Participant"
exception was extended to situations in which the State is acting as a
seller in Reeves v. Stake,84 and as an employer in White v. Massachusetts
Council of Construction Employers.8 5
It is from this rough set of criteria that the Court has attempted to
balance the right of the States to enact police legislation with the need to
promote free trade among all the markets of the nation. Unfortunately, it
has proven to be considerably easier to summarize these rules than to
employ them. The Court has confused and frustrated observers by apply-
ing the strict scrutiny test to statutes that appear to be facially neutral,
86
finding valid legislation to be unconstitutional when combined with
other valid legislation,87 and seemingly abandoning the facially neutral
test altogether for transportation statutes. 88 As one commentator has
observed, the Court's Dormant Commerce Clause jurisprudence "often
appears to turn more on ad hoc reactions to particular cases than on any
consistent application of coherent principles. ' '8 Why then has a doc-
trine with such seemingly straight-forward guidelines turned into, as one
Justice succinctly put it, a "tangled underbrush,"9 ° apt to capture unwary
state legislatures?
III. THE CONFUSION WROUGHT BY MARSHALL'S IMAGINARY FRIEND
One obvious reason for the Court's inconsistent Dormant Com-
merce Clause edicts is the negative doctrine's reliance upon the silence
of Congress as a source of constitutional legitimacy. 9 Under this
81. Id. at 802.
82. See id. at 806.
83. Id. at 810.
84. 447 U.S. 429 (1980).
85. 460 U.S. 204 (1983).
86. See C & A Carbone v. Clarkstown, 511 U.S. 383 (1994).
87. See West Lynn Creamery, Inc. v. Healy, 114 S. Ct. 2205, 2214-15 (1994) (valid
Massachusetts tax on all creamery dealers combined with valid subsidy paid to in-state farmers
violates the Commerce Clause).
88. See Kassel v. Consolidated Freightways Corp., 450 U.S. 662, 675-76 (1981).
89. L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTrrTUTIONAL LAW 439 (2d. ed. 1988).
90. Northwestern States Portland Cement Co. v. Minnesota, 358 U.S. 450, 457 (1959).
91. See, e.g., Oregon-Washington R.R. Co. v. State of Washington, 270 U.S. 87, 101 (1926).
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rationale, the Court is merely carrying out the unexpressed will of Con-
gress in approving or rejecting state activities affecting interstate com-
merce. If the Court feels a particular enterprise overly burdens the
national market, the silence of Congress is deemed indicative of an
intent to restrict such local regulations.92 Conversely, if the Court
believes a state initiative does not unduly implicate commerce that is
national in character, the failure of Congress to act is seen as a sign that
regulation is permissible.93 In essence, the Court is holding "that Con-
gress by keeping silent sometimes means that it is keeping silent and
sometimes means that it is speaking." 94
While such an ambiguous pronouncement may delight a linguist, it
does little to guide the local officeholder charged with implementing a
potentially unconstitutional mandate. The Court never articulates the
standards by which it delineates the unexpressed will of Congress,
95
making it impossible for interested observers to accurately predict
whether a particular regulation will survive such scrutiny. The interpre-
tation of congressional silence also rests upon a jump in logic that seems
frequently unwarranted. The Court presumes that Congress is always
attempting to communicate some sort of an opinion concerning the legit-
imacy of state regulation, ignoring the more plausible explanation that
legislative inactivity is caused by a simple lack of awareness that a par-
ticular field of commerce is being regulated at the local level. 96 To con-
fuse matters even further, members of the Court regularly waver in their
advocacy of silence as a guide to legislative intent. In one example cited
by John Grabow, Justices Burger, O'Connor, and Powell heavily criti-
cized the "novel theory that congressional intent can be inferred from its
silence" a mere year after relying upon exactly that theory in interpreting
the Communications Act of 1934. 97 When this lack of judicial decisive-
ness is combined with the unspoken standards and often baseless pre-
sumptions employed in interpreting legislative silence, it is no wonder
that the unexpressed will of Congress has been deemed a "poor beacon
to follow."9 8
Perhaps recognizing the tenuousness of basing Dormant Commerce
92. See Russell Chapin, Chadha, Garcia and the Dormant Commerce Clause Limitations on
State Authority to Regulate, 23 URB. LAW. 163, 173 (1991).
93. See id.
94. Id. (quoting Thomas Powell, Business Taxes and Interstate Commerce, PROCEEDING. OF
THE NAT'L TAx ASS'N, 337, 338-39 (1937)).
95. See John C. Grabow, Congressional Silence and the Search for Legislative Intent: A
Venture into "Speculative Unrealities", B.U. L. REv. 737, 753 (1985).
96. See, e.g., Zuber v. Allen, 396 U.S. 168, 185-86 n.21 (1969).
97. Grabow, supra note 95, at 753 (quoting Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith v. Curran,
456 U.S. 353, 402 (1981) (Powell, J., dissenting)).
98. Zuber, 396 U.S. at 185.
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Clause jurisprudence solely on such a dim light, the Court has enunci-
ated several other theories that purport to explain adjudication under the
negative doctrine. Unfortunately, these propositions have proven to be
no more reliable than congressional silence in providing guidance to leg-
islative and judicial bodies considering regulations that affect interstate
commerce. One frequently employed approach, the Economic Theory,
emphasizes freedom of trade as a constitutional value that requires the
Court to step in when the States unreasonably interfere with national
commerce.99 The usual justification for this principle is that protectionist
measures "interfere with the efficient disposition of resources through-
out the country," 10 0 therein exemplifying the type of commercial warfare
that the Commerce Clause was arguably designed to inhibit.' 1 While
the eradication of onerous trade barriers would seem to be a fairly
straight-forward premise, in practice it requires complex value judg-
ments that invite inconsistent results. To determine whether the eco-
nomic burden created by a state initiative is excessive, the Court must
weigh the local interest involved against the harm imposed on interstate
commerce-a process one Justice has deemed akin to "judging whether
a particular line is longer than a particular rock is heavy."1'02 This obser-
vation rings especially true when the questionable regulation involves
health and safety, since under such circumstances the Court must bal-
ance the value of human life against economic efficiency. 103
The Court has also attempted to explain the nuances of its pro-
nouncements through a Mixed Political and Economic Theory which
stresses the need to correct distortions to the political process caused by
protectionist legislation."° Such bureaucratic perversion is believed to
arise when a State institutes a regulation which principally burdens those
99. See, e.g., Mark Tushnet, Rethinking the Dormant Commerce Clause, 1979 Wis. L. REv.
125, 141-43 (1979).
100. STONE, supra note 58, at 293.
101. See, e.g., Collins, supra note 15, at 64. ("A basic purpose of the framers was to curb
interstate exploitation by stronger states and by those with geographic advantages").
102. Bendix Autolite Corp. v. Midwesco Enterprises, Inc., 486 U.S. 888, 897 (1988) (Scalia,
J., concurring).
103. See Thomas K. Anson and P.M. Schenkkan, Federalism, the Dormant Commerce Clause,
and State-Owned Resources, 59 TEx. L. REv. 71, 83 (1980). Compare in this regard Southern
Pacific Co. v. Arizona (discrimination against interstate commerce outweighs "slight"
improvement in train safety) with South Carolina State Highway Dept. v. Barnwell Bros., Inc.
(contribution to highway safety outweighs burden to national commercial interests).
104. See STONE ET AL., supra note 58, at 293-94. The Dormant Commerce Clause is
additionally purported to rest on a purely Political Theory, which espouses that the negative
doctrine is necessary to protect the union from "state statutes [which] are incompatible with the
ideal of a unified nation." Id. at 293. Although such a supposition is attractive in light of our
nation's early economic discord, its actual role in Dormant Commerce Clause jurisprudence is
questionable. The Court regularly allows the States to favor local interests over out-of-state
interests, so long as the burden imposed on interstate commerce is not exorbitant. See, e.g., Exxon
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located outside of its borders, since in such a scenario "legislative action
is not likely to be subjected to those political restraints which are nor-
mally exerted on legislation where it affects adversely some interests
within the state."105 Given this notion, one would expect the Court to
defer to the will of the State when those affected by local legislation are
represented in the political process. As at least one commentator has
observed, however, this deference does not appear to actually occur;
instead the Court has continued to closely scrutinize such cases.
10 6
Thus, rather then invoking a bright-line rule based upon political repre-
sentation, the Court has chosen to retain a line of precedent that places
indeterminate emphasis upon popular suffrage. As a result, the Mixed
Political and Economic Theory provides questionable guidance to those
parties concerned with issues that potentially implicate the Dormant
Commerce Clause.
The inconsistent application of dormant principles is also presuma-
bly generated in part by the fact that the Court is engaging in what
amounts to legislative behavior.0 7 Rather than performing "the normal
judicial task of interpreting and applying text or determining and apply-
ing common-law tradition," ' 8 the Court makes Lochner-esque'0 9 value
judgments concerning the wisdom of state economic initiatives. O If the
Court is not satisfied with the justification offered by the State for imple-
menting a particular regulation, it will act as a "super-legislature" and
overrule the wisdom of elected officials and their constituents. 1 ' Leav-
ing aside the very real possibility that the Court is violating the separa-
tion of powers philosophy behind the Constitution in undertaking such a
practice, the judicial system as a whole appears to be ill-suited to con-
duct the type of intricate analysis necessary to determine whether a local
mandate actually creates an undue burden on interstate commerce.
Unlike Congress and its agencies, which have vast resources at their
disposal to conduct a thorough investigation of complex economic poli-
cies, 112 courts are at the mercy of experts furnished by parties in interest
Corp. v. Governor of Maryland, 437 U.S. 117 (1978); South Carolina Highway Dept. v. Barnwell
Bros., Inc., 303 U.S. 177 (1938).
105. Barnwell Bros., Inc., 303 U.S. at 184 n.2.
106. See Chapin, supra note 92, at 178.
107. See, e.g., Camps Newfound/Owatonna, Inc. v. Town of Harrison, Maine, 117 S. Ct. 1590,
1619 (1997) (Thomas, J., joined by Rehnquist, C.J. and Scalia, J., dissenting) (Dormant
Commerce Clause jurisprudence constitutes "legislation by default").
108. American Trucking Ass'ns, Inc. v. Smith, 496 U.S. 167, 203 (1990) (Scalia, J.,
concurring).
109. Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
110. See Daniel A. Farber, State Regulation and the Dormant Commerce Clause, 18 URB.
LAW. 567, 571-72 (1986).
111. Southern Pacific Co. v. Arizona, 325 U.S. 761, 788 (1945) (Black, J., dissenting).
112. See Redish & Nugent, supra note 36, at 594.
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and inefficient formal procedures. 13 As a result of these limitations, the
balancing of interests conducted by the Court is performed, if not in the
proverbial dark, at least under a heavy fog. Considering such difficult
conditions, it should probably come as a surprise to no one that nine
economic layman cannot consistently decide national commercial
problems.
In sum then, the Court has developed such a wide variety of enig-
matic theories to support Dormant Commerce Clause jurisprudence that
each Justice can essentially rummage through the philosophies to reach
the result in a particular case that he or she feels is appropriate. 4 This
creates a situation in which seemingly bedrock "facially neutral" and
"facially discriminatory" tests become little more than window dressing.
The chaos which one might expect to result from reliance upon such
capricious standards was on full display in the remarkable Camps New-
found/Owatonna' 15 decision, where the five-person majority and four-
person dissent managed to disagree on the applicability of virtually
every Dormant Commerce Clause tenet previously announced by the
Court.
IV. CAMPS NEWFOUND/OWATONNA,INC. V. TOWN OF
HARRISON, MAINE
In 1996 Maine created "a general exemption from real estate and
personal, property taxes for 'benevolent and charitable institutions incor-
porated' by the State." 16 The intent of this exemption, as interpreted by
the Maine Supreme Judicial Court, was the reimbursement of those
charitable organizations that had provided the State's citizens with social
welfare benefits. 17 The Maine court reasoned that when an
institution [through] its charitable activities relieves the government
of part of [its welfare] burden, [that institution] is conferring a pecu-
niary benefit upon the body politic, and in receiving exemption from
taxation it is merely being given a 'quid pro quo' for its services in
providing something which otherwise the government would have to
provide.1 18
While the statute created a complete tax exemption for charitable
113. See Richard D. Friedman, Putting the Dormancy Doctrine Out of its Misery, 12 CARDOZO
L. REV. 1745, 1759 (1991).
114. See Chapin, supra note 92, at 182.
115. Camps Newfound/Owatonna, Inc. v. Town of Harrison, Maine, 117 S. Ct. 1590 (1997).
116. Id. at 1594 n.2 (quoting ME. REV. STAT. ANN., tit. 36, §652 (1)(A) (Supp. 1996).
117. Camps Newfound/Owatonna, Inc. v. Town of Harriosn, 655 A.2d 876, 870 (Me. 1995).
118. Episcopal Camp Foundation, Inc. v. Town of Hope, 666 A.2d. 108, 110 (Me. 1995)
(quoting Young Men's Christian Assn. of Germantown v. City of Philadelphia, 187 A. 204, 210
(Pa. 1936)).
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institutions that provide benefits primarily to Maine residents, those
organizations catering principally to out-of-state clientele were only eli-
gible for a limited tax break." 9
Camps Newfound/Owatonna is a nonprofit institution that runs a
Christian Science summer camp for children in Harrison, Maine. E°
About 95% of the children that attend the camp are not Maine resi-
dents.' 2 ' In addition to receiving income from an endowment and contri-
butions from private donors, the bulk of the institution's revenue comes
from camper tuition which averages $400 per week.' 2 The camp paid
more than $20,000 per year in real estate and personal property taxes
between 1989 and 1991, but due to the fact that most of its children
come from outside of Maine, it was not eligible to receive the charitable
tax exemption.12  Moreover, since the tuition received by Camps New-
found/Owatonna each week exceeded $30 per child, under the statute
the camp was ineligible to receive even the restricted exemption.
124
In 1992 the camp requested that the Town of Harrison refund the
property taxes paid to it by the institution between 1989 and 1991, as
well as a future exemption from such taxes.'25 The primary basis for the
camp's request was its belief that the Maine charitable exemption vio-
lated the Commerce Clause. 126 The Town of Harrison promptly rejected
the request, and as a result the camp filed suit against the city and its tax
assessors and collectors. 1 27 The Superior Court of Maine agreed with
the camp that the statute burdened interstate commerce in an impermis-
sible manner, but on appeal the Maine Supreme Judicial Court reversed,
finding the tax exemption to "regulate[ ] evenhandedly with only inci-
dental effects on interstate commerce."'' 12  The United States Supreme
Court granted certiorari and overturned the decision of the Maine
Supreme Judicial Court, holding that the property tax exemption ran
119. Camps Newfound/Owatonna, Inc., 117 S. Ct. at 1594 n.2 (1997) (quoting ME. REV. STAT.
ANN., tit. 36 §652 (1)(A)(l)(Supp. 1996)).
120. See Camps NewfoundlOwatonna, Inc., 117 S. Ct. at 1594.
121. See id.
122. See id.
123. See id.
124. See id. at 1594-95.
125. See id. at 1595.
126. See id. The camp also contended that the Maine tax exemption violated the Privileges
and Immunities Clause, Art IV, § 2, of the U.S. Constitution, and the Equal Protection Clause of
both the U.S. and Maine Constitution. See id. at 1595 n.4. The Maine Supreme Judicial Court
held that the statute did not violate either the federal or state Equal Protection Clause, and also
found that the Privileges and Immunities Clause of the federal Constitution was complied with. As
a result, none of these claims were before the U.S. Supreme Court. Id.
127. See id.
128. Id. (quoting Camps Newfound/Owatonna, Inc. v. Town of Harrison, Maine, 655 A.2d.
876, 879 (Me. 1995)).
[Vol. 53:333
THE PROPOSED DOMESTIC CHARITY EXCEPTION
afoul of the Dormant Commerce Clause.12 9
A. Analysis of the Majority
In an opinion written by Justice Stevens, the Majority examined a
wide range of arguments presented by the Town of Harrison. The
municipality's initial contention was that the tax exemption did not trig-
ger Dormant Commerce Clause scrutiny of any sort, either because the
children who attended the camp were not "articles of commerce" or
because the camp's "product [was] delivered and 'consumed' entirely
within Maine. '"130 The Court rejected each of these propositions, noting
first that the camp received most of its children from outside of Maine,
thus necessarily creating transportation across state lines (which the
Court previously held to implicate commerce concerns).13 1 Moreover,
the Court deemed the summer camp to be akin to the racially discrimina-
tory hotel in Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. U.S., 132 whose products were
consumed locally but nonetheless negatively affected commerce by dis-
couraging interstate travel. 133 The Town's final argument against dor-
mant analysis was that the doctrine did not apply to real estate taxes; this
contention was also dismissed by the Court, which observed that "a tax
on real estate, like any other tax, may impermissibly burden interstate
commerce." 1
34
Having ascertained that the Dormant Commerce Clause was impli-
cated by the Maine tax exemption, the Court then turned its attention to
figuring out whether the statute was facially neutral or facially discrimi-
natory. For the Majority, this determination was relatively simple: "[i]t
is not necessary to look beyond the text of this statute to determine that
it discriminates against interstate commerce... [T]he statute encourages
affected entities to limit their out-of-state clientele, and penalizes the
principally nonresident customers of businesses catering to a primarily
interstate market." 135 The Majority believed the statute was functionally
similar to an impermissible export tariff, targeting out-of-state consum-
ers "by taxing the businesses that principally serve them." 136 Curiously,
after finding the tax exemption facially discriminatory, the Court
declined to address whether the statute may have nonetheless passed its
129. See Camps Newfound/Owatonna, Inc. v. Town of Harrison, Maine, 117 S. Ct. 1590,
1595, 1596-98 (1997).
130. Id. at 1596 (quoting Brief for Respondents 17-18).
131. See Camps NewfoundlOwatonna, Inc., 117 S. Ct. at 1596-97.
132. 379 U.S. 241 (1964).
133. See Camps NewfoundlOwatonna, Inc., 117 S. Ct. at 1597.
134. Id.
135. Id. at 1598.
136. Id. at 1600.
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"strict scrutiny" test.137 It reasoned, somewhat unconvincingly, that
since the Town of Harrison failed to defend the exemption under the
test, there was no duty placed upon the Court to do so for it. 138
Once the Majority determined to its satisfaction that the tax exemp-
tion violated the negative aspect of the Commerce Clause, it briefly
addressed the expediency of creating a different rule for tax exemptions
granted to charitable organizations. 39 Observing that in previous deci-
sions it held the Dormant Commerce Clause applicable to non-profit
activities, the Court reaffirmed this position but acknowledged that per-
haps a charitable exception is warranted. 4 ' Instead of closely examin-
ing the feasibility of such an exclusionary rule, however, the Court
chose to defer to the legislative branch: "[i]f there is need for a special
exception for nonprofits, Congress not only has the power to create it,
but also is in a far better position than we to determine its dimen-
sions."' 41 The Dissent demonstrated greater interest in a judicially con-
ceived exclusion and addressed the possibility at length. 42
The Town of Harrison's final attempt to vindicate the tax exemp-
tion was based upon a theory that the statute should be perceived as an
outlay of government funds, thereby constituting either a permissible
subsidy or a "purchase" of charitable services by the State of Maine. 143
It first reasoned that a tax exemption is economically no different than a
subsidy, which the Court had previously indicated in dicta survived Dor-
mant Commerce Clause scrutiny.'" The Majority found this argument
unavailing, noting that it had also previously indicated that there is a
"constitutionally significant difference" between a tax exemption and a
subsidy.'45 The Town next contended that the tax exemption constituted
a "purchase" of welfare assistance which invoked the "Market Partici-
pant" exception.' 46 The Court rejected this proposition as well, observ-
ing it held in New Energy Company of Indiana v. Limbach'47that
although a tax program may have "the purpose and effect of subsidizing
a particular industry," that "does not transform it into a form of state
137. See id. at 1601.
138. See id. at 1601-02.
139. See id. at 1602-04.
140. See id.
141. Id. at 1604.
142. See supra notes 165-68 and accompanying text.
143. See Camps NewfoundlOwatonna, Inc., 117 S. Ct. at 1604-05.
144. See id. at 1605. (The Town relied upon dicta in West Lynn Creamery, Inc. v. Healy, 114
S. Ct. 2205, 2214 (1994)) to support its argument that a tax exemption is no different than a
subsidy).
145. Camps Newfound/Owatonna, Inc., 117 S. Ct. at 1605-06.
146. See id. at 1606.
147. 486 U.S. 269 (1988).
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participation in the free market."' 48
Having found every justification offered by the Town of Harrison
to be deficient, the Majority then held the Maine charitable tax exemp-
tion unconstitutional. 4 9
B. Analysis of the Dissent
In stark contrast to the Majority's opinion the Dissent would have
upheld the Maine statute under any of the previously enunciated Dor-
mant Commerce Clause standards. It believed that the tax exemption
"survives even our most demanding commerce-clause scrutiny"'' 50
because the statute "has nothing to do with [the] economic protection-
ism" that the Dormant Commerce Clause doctrine was created to
combat. 51
The Dissent began its analysis by scrutinizing the Majority's con-
clusion that the Maine statute was facially discriminatory. 5 2 The Court
recently held that disparate treatment is discriminatory only if the
objects of the discrimination are similarly situated for constitutional pur-
poses, 53 and to the Dissent this distinction exonerated the tax exemp-
tion. 54 It observed that for purposes of receiving a tax subsidy, property
used to help relieve a State of its welfare burden is not similarly situated
to property which is used primarily to benefit non-residents. 155 Accord-
ingly, the Dissent argued that the Maine exemption was incapable of
being facially discriminatory, and deserved to be examined under the
more tolerant "balancing test" applied to facially neutral legislation.5 6
Employing this "balancing test," the Dissent would have held that the
health and safety concerns promoted by assisting charitable institutions
outweighed any effect that the Maine statute may have had on interstate
commerce. 57 Acknowledging that some observers might remain uncon-
vinced that the tax exemption was in fact facially neutral, the Dissent
went on to uphold the statute under the facially discriminatory "virtually
per se rule of invalidity" as well.' 58
148. Camps NewfoundlOwatonna, Inc., 117 S. Ct. at 1606-07 (quoting New Energy Co. of Ind.
v. Limbach, 486 U.S. 269, 277 (1988)).
149. See Camps Newfound/Owatonna, Inc., 117 S. Ct. at 1608.
150. Id. (Scalia, J., joined by Rehnquist, C.J., Ginsburg, J. and Thomas, J., dissenting).
151. Id. at 1614.
152. See id. at 1608.
153. See General Motors Corp. v. Tracy, 117 S. Ct 811, 823-24 (1997).
154. See Camps NewfoundlOwatonna, Inc. 117 S. Ct at 1611 (Scalia, J., joined by Rehnquist,
C.J., Ginsburg, J. and Thomas, J., dissenting).
155. See id.
156. See id.
157. See id.
158. See id. at 1611-13.
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While the Dissent did make a half-hearted attempt to justify the
Maine tax exemption under the previously announced "per se rules" and
"balancing tests," it becomes plain in reading the Dissent's opinion that
it believed these inquiries were completely unnecessary. In its view, the
statute did not raise Dormant Commerce Clause concerns at all. The
Dissent opined that the Maine initiative was a carefully crafted exemp-
tion aimed only at reimbursing those entities that provide welfare bene-
fits to the State's residents. 59 Such a statute does not implicate the
negative aspect of the Commerce Clause, the Dissent reasoned, because
"[o]ur cases have always recognized the legitimacy of limiting state-
provided welfare benefits to bona fide residents."1 60 While acknowledg-
ing that there is a difference between a State providing such benefits
directly and compensating a private organization for doing so, the Dis-
sent did not believe it was constitutionally significant. "[Since] a State
that provides social services directly may limit its largesse to its own
residents, [we] see no reason why a State that chooses to provide some
of its social services indirectly-by compensating or subsidizing private
charitable providers-cannot be similarly restrictive." 6 ' Consequently,
the Dissent advised going beyond mere approval of the Maine exemp-
tion under traditional dormant scrutiny. Arguing that the provision of
social welfare benefits "implicates none of the concerns underlying our
negative-commerce-clause jurisprudence," it advocated the creation of
entirely new limitation to the Dormant Commerce Clause - the
"Domestic Charity" exception. 62
V. CRITICAL EXAMINATION OF SCALIA'S PROPOSED "DOMESTIC
CHARITY" EXCEPTION
It is not particularly surprising that an opinion written by Justice
Scalia supports the formulation of another restriction upon the reach of
the Dormant Commerce Clause. In the West Lynn Creamery v. Healy
decision in which he concurred, Scalia voiced his sentiment that "[t]he
object [of the Court] should be ... to produce a clear rule that honors the
holdings of our past decisions but declines to extend the rationale that
produced those decisions any further." '163 Camps Newfound/Owatonna
represents just such an expansion, this time into the uncharted waters of
tax exemptions for non-profit charitable organizations. What is rather
interesting, however, is how close Scalia came to convincing the Court
159. See id. at 1609.
160. Id. at 1612.
161. Id. at 1612-13 (emphasis in original).
162. Id. at 1613-14.
163. West Lynn Creamery, Inc. v. Healy, 114 S. Ct 2205, 2220 (1994) (Scalia, J., concurring
in judgment).
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that such an exception is warranted. Whereas in the past his proposed
limitations to the doctrine had met with little enthusiasm, 64 the narrow
5-4 decision (with a non-committal majority)1 65 in Camps Newfound!
Owatonna seems to indicate that the Court may be prepared to rein in its
Dormant Commerce Clause jurisprudence, if only just a bit.
As was mentioned earlier in this article, there are three principles
theories currently utilized to support the existence of the Commerce
Clause in its negative state-the Political Theory, the Economic Theory,
and the Mixed Political/Economic Theory. 166 Although it is questiona-
ble whether the Court consistently follows such tenets,1 67 they nonethe-
less encapsulate the aspirations of the dormant doctrine in its idealized
state, and thus provide a helpful framework in which to determine
whether a given local initiative should be deemed unconstitutional or
not. To ascertain whether the "Domestic Charity" exception advocated
by Scalia, Rehnquist, Ginsburg and Thomas is doctrinally sound, one
ought to begin by examining it in light of these suppositions.
A. Faithfulness to Fundamentals
Professor Donald Regan has written an excellent exposition on the
Dormant Commerce Clause which explains the three theories and the
self-serving behavior they were designed to combat. 168 He observes that
the Court seems to be primarily concerned with preventing "purposeful
protectionism" when it employs the Dormant Commerce Clause,16 9 and
suggests that
a state statute ... is protectionist if and only if: (a) the statute ... was
adopted for the purposes of improving the competitive position of
local (in-state) economic actors ... vis-a-vis their foreign ... ([ ] out-
of-state) competitors; and (b) the statute ... is analogous in form to
the traditional instruments of protectionism-the tariff, the quota, or
the outright embargo.17o
Is the Maine tax exemption a piece of protectionist legislation
under this standard? The answer seems to be no. Although such an
exemption is analogous to a traditional instrument of purposeful protec-
tionism, 17 it doesn't satisfy the first prong of the Regan test. The stat-
164. See Day, supra note 40, at 703-04.
165. See supra notes 139-41 and accompanying text.
166. See STONE, ET AL, supra note 58, at 293; supra notes 99-108 and accompanying text.
167. See supra notes 99-108 and accompanying text.
168. See Regan, supra note 37.
169. See id. at 1093.
170. Id. at 1094-95.
171. See Camps Newfound/Owatonna, Inc. v. Town of Harrison, Maine, 117 S. Ct. 1590, 1600
(1997)("[T]he Maine statute . .. functionally serves as an export tariff').
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ute was created to compensate private charities that furnished forms of
social welfare which Maine itself couldn't provide, not to improve the
competitive position of the State's charitable organizations in relation to
their foreign counterparts. In the words of the Maine Supreme Judicial
Court, the objective of the tax exemption was merely to give a "quid pro
quo" to "[a]ny institution which by its charitable activities relieves the
government of part of [its welfare] burden." '72 Instructive too in this
regard is the Majority opinion at the United States Supreme Court level,
which never maintained that the statute was adopted for any purpose
other than the simple remuneration of deserving benevolent
organizations. 173
Assuming, arguendo, that the Maine statute did meet the criteria of
his "protectionist" definition, Regan goes on to consider the three pri-
mary objections to such legislation: (1) the "concept of union" objection
(Political Theory), (2) the "resentment/retaliation" objection (Mixed
Theory), and (3) the "efficiency" objection (Economic Theory). 7 ' The
Maine charitable tax exemption does not appear to implicate any of the
concerns behind these familiar principles, 75 and hence seems beyond
Dormant Commerce Clause reproach.
The first objection, "concept of union," is based upon the argument
that protectionist legislation is at odds with political unity because it "is
172. Episcopal Camp Foundation, Inc. v. Town of Hope, 666 A.2d 108, 110 (Me. 1995)
(quoting Young Men's Christian Assn. of Germantown v. City of Philadelphia, 187 A. 204, 210
(Pa. 1936)).
173. Regan concentrates on what he calls the "movement-of-goods area" in his thesis that the
Court is concerned with preventing purposeful protectionism. Regan, supra note 37, at 1093.
These cases are defined by what is not included among them-cases involving regulation of
highways and other interstate transportation instrumentalities, cases involving taxation of
interstate commerce, and cases involving the "Market Participant" exception. See id. at 1098-99.
While Regan's protectionism theory applies to all scenarios invoking Dormant Commerce Clause
scrutiny, in these cases he believes additional national interests are often at work. Since the Maine
exemption implicates tax considerations, it is worth examining what these other national interests
are in the taxation area.
Regan observes that in addition to suppressing protectionism, the Court's other concern with
interstate taxation is ensuring that it be fairly apportioned. See id. at 1185-86. In a nutshell, this
requirement prevents the States from taxing interstate companies in the same manner in which
they tax intrastate companies, since such a scheme would "produce multiple taxation when [a]
business operates in many states." Id. at 1186. Accordingly, "states may not levy taxes on the
total operations of interstate business." Id. Charitable tax exemptions, however, do not operate in
the same manner as do unapportioned taxes. Whereas such taxes continue to be constitutionally
deficient regardless if they are applied in a perfectly uniform manner, see id. at 1187, "generally
applicable nondiscriminatory tax exemptions [do not run] afoul of the dormant Commerce
Clause." Camps Newfound/Owatonna, Inc., 117 S. Ct. at 1604 n.19. Consequently, the fair
apportionment requirement is not transposable to charitable tax exemptions, and such exemptions
are properly scrutinized solely under Regan's protectionism theory.
174. See Regan, supra note 37, at 1112-13.
175. See supra notes 99-108 and accompanying text.
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the economic equivalent of war." '176 Regan notes, however, that legisla-
tion is not economically hostile if "[i]t takes nothing away from [non-
state residents] that we would normally think they have as much right to
as [state residents] have." '177 Under this delimitation, a State may dis-
criminate in the distribution of welfare benefits without acting in a pro-
tectionist manner since non-state residents have no right to such
advantages to begin with. This conclusion conforms with the observa-
tions of the Dissent in Camps Newfound/Owatonna, which pointed out
that the Court has long acknowledged the ability of the States to confine
the welfare benefits that they confer to their own residents.178 The Maine
tax exemption falls squarely into Regan's caveat, as its impetus was
merely the reimbursement of charitable organizations that had contrib-
uted to the public assistance efforts of the community. While the Major-
ity did not disagree with this characterization of the statute's purpose, it
nonetheless contended that non-discriminatory means of providing wel-
fare benefits were available to Maine, and therefore that the statute was
making a gratuitous distinction between state residents and non-state
residents.'79 The validity of such alternatives is questionable, however,
as the options offered by the Majority appear to also be discriminatory,
just in a nonregulatory way. 180 Ultimately then, the lack of economic
hostility and reasonable alternatives indicate that the Maine tax exemp-
tion does not raise any "concept of union" concerns.
The "resentment/retaliation" objection is that protectionist statutes
tend to produce an antagonistic environment in which the States are
encouraged to economically retaliate against one another, eventually
resulting in commercial isolation throughout the nation. 18' The Majority
relied in part upon this theory when it found the Maine statute to be
unconstitutional, surmising that the exemption was in the class of legis-
lation "destructive to the harmony of the States.' 82 As pointed out by
the Dissent, however, "States have restricted public assistance since
colonial times ... and such self-interested behavior ... is inherent in the
very structure of our federal system." 183 Given this long and incontro-
176. Regan, supra note 37, at 1113.
177. Id.
178. See Camps Newfound/Owatonna, Inc. v. Town of Harrison, Maine, 117 S. Ct. 1590, 1612
(1997) (Scalia, J., joined by Rehnquist, C.J., Ginsburg, J., and Thomas, J., dissenting).
179. See id. at 1601 n.16.
180. See id. at 1612 n.3 (Scalia, J., joined by Rehnquist, C.J., Ginsburg, J., and Thomas, J.,
dissenting).
181. See Regan, supra note 37, at 1114-15.
182. Camps Newfound/Owatonna, Inc., 117 S. Ct. at 1595 (quoting Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S.
(9 Wheat.) 1, 224 (1824) (Johnson, J., concurring)).
183. Camps NewfoundlOwatonna, Inc., 117 S. Ct. at 1612 (Citation omitted) (Scalia, J., joined
by Rehnquist, C.J., Ginsburg, J., and Thomas, J., dissenting).
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vertible tradition, it would seem to be disingenuous to insinuate that
state-imposed limitations upon those who may receive welfare benefits
threaten "the political viability of the union itself."' 84 Over two hundred
years of history instead suggests that charitable initiatives like the Maine
tax exemption do not induce the type of hostile conditions that the
"resentment/retaliation" objection warns against, and therefore such leg-
islation fails to have a protectionist effect.
Regan's final objection is based upon "inefficiency."' 85 It holds
that protectionist measures are wasteful because they push business
away from efficient out-of-state producers without any sort of federally
cognizable justification for doing so.' 86 While such a theory was not
explicitly utilized by the Majority, it seems plain most commentators
would find a federally cognizable benefit in Maine's attempt to ensure
that its populace has access to social welfare programs. According to
Regan, "[s]o long as there is no constitutionally stipulated policy against
[the purpose of the state statute, the achievement of the statutes goals] is
a good thing from the federal viewpoint if [the State] says it is."' 87
Since it is hard to imagine a constitutionally stipulated policy against
providing welfare assistance to Maine's less fortunate citizens, and
because Maine clearly believed such governmental support to be a
"good thing," the charitable tax exemption would appear to provide the
necessary cognizable benefit. Moreover, while a particular welfare plan
may be "inefficient" in the eyes of Mr. Herbert Spencer,' 88 it would be
difficult for anyone to rationally argue that such a program may not be
maintained by a State because a different State can provide the same
program at a lower cost. Public assistance is supported by loftier princi-
ples. Accordingly, the Maine statute avoids implicating the "ineffi-
ciency" objection and traditional protectionist concerns.
In the end then, the charitable tax exemption does not seem to
invoke any of the three central objections to state behavior that support
Dormant Commerce Clause jurisprudence. It is neither "the economic
equivalent of war,"' 89 a predecessor to commercial retaliation, 190 or
"inefficient" in a constitutionally relevant sense.' 91 While this revela-
184. See Regan, supra note 37, at 1114.
185. See Id. at 1115.
186. See id. at 1118.
187. See id.
188. Herbert Spencer was a nineteenth-century social darwinist who is perhaps best known as
being the inspiration for Justice Holmes' famous statement that "[t]he Fourteenth Amendment
does not enact Mr. Herbert Spencer's Social Statics." Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 75
(1905) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
189. See supra notes 173-77 and accompanying text.
190. See supra notes 178-81 and accompanying text.
191. See supra notes 182-85 and accompanying text.
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tion indicates that the Court was probably incorrect in deeming the
Maine statute unconstitutional, it does not necessarily indicate that the
creation of an entirely new exception to the Dormant Commerce Clause
is warranted. Since any exception is just that, an exception to the rule, it
must provide viable parameters, lest the exclusion engulf the entire
doctrine.
B. The Impossible Task of Creating Meaningful Limitations
One of the most hotly contested points in the Camps Newfound!
Owatonna decision involved this very issue. While addressing the
Town of Harrison's contention that the charitable tax exemption fell
within the "Market Participant" exception, the Majority opined that the
Maine statute was undesirably expansive: "Maine's tax exemption-
which sweeps to cover broad swathes of the nonprofit sector-...
would swallow the rule against discriminatory tax schemes."' 92 The
Dissent vigorously disagreed, arguing the exemption was not applicable
to all non-profit organizations, only those "benevolent and charitable
institutions ... organized and conducted exclusively for benevolent and
charitable purposes" which used the exempted property "to further the
organization's charitable purposes."1 93 While this exchange was in ref-
erence to a proposed expansion of an already existing Dormant Com-
merce Clause exception, it is equally relevant to any discussion
concerning the feasibility of creating a new exception. What the dia-
logue plainly demonstrates is a fundamental disagreement between the
members of the Court. Is the Maine statute too broad to constitute suita-
ble inspiration for another Dormant Commerce Clause standard, as the
Majority believes, or is it sufficiently limited in its reach to be an appro-
priate influence, as the Dissent would suggest?
At first blush the position of the Dissent appears to have some
merit. In addition to the text of the charitable tax exemption itself, Scalia
relied upon several decisions by the court's of Maine in attempting to
provide limitations to the reach of the statute. The most prominent diffi-
culty in creating such boundaries is defining what constitutes the "char-
ity" which is to be dispensed. The Maine Supreme Judicial Court
previously attempted to make this determination, characterizing "char-
ity" as those activities which are
for the benefit of an indefinite number of persons, either by bringing
their minds or hearts under the influence of education or religion, by
192. Camps Newfound/Owatonna, Inc. v. Town of Harrison, Maine, 117 S. Ct. 1590, 1607
(1997).
193. Id. at 1609 (Scalia, J., joined by Rehnquist, C.J., Ginsburg, J., and Thomas, J., dissenting)
(quoting Poland v. Poland Spring Health Institute, Inc., 649 A.2d 1098, 1100 (Me. 1994)).
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relieving their bodies from disease, suffering, or constraint, by assist-
ing them to establish themselves in life,
or by erecting or maintaining public buildings or works or otherwise
lessening the burdens of government. 194
The Dissent in Camps Newfound/Owatonna found this description
to be sufficiently specific to justify excluding the Maine tax initiative
from Dormant Commerce Clause scrutiny. 195 It pointed to several exam-
ples where the exemption had been denied to an institution as proof that
the statute had enforceable limitations. 196 Included among these illustra-
tions were several organizations that most people would consider "chari-
table," such as a wildlife sanctuary, a church and a public housing
complex. 197 The proffered basis for denying the exemption was that
these bodies did not provide sufficient public benefits or failed to use
their property solely for charitable purposes.198 In light of such strict
judicial scrutiny, one might justifiably wonder whether the tax exemp-
tion had too narrow of a scope.
Upon closer examination, however, it becomes readily apparent
that the statute suffers from just the opposite deficiency - it is too
broad to be prudently applied. The Dissent's analysis, while initially
appealing, is incomplete in that it fails to address the previous renounce-
ment of a line of precedent which required the Court to determine
whether an organization's behavior fell within an imprecisely defined
category of activities. In Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit
Authority, the Court rejected "as unsound in principle and unworkable in
practice" a Commerce Clause immunity doctrine whose applicability
was judicially determined according to whether a particular governmen-
tal function was "integral" or "traditional". 199 The basis for this repudia-
tion was threefold-the Court felt that from a historical, a nonhistorical,
and a federalism standpoint such an endeavor was unwise.200 These
concerns are equally applicable to the proposed "Domestic Charity"
exception, indicating that the Court would be ill-advised to enter into the
practice of defining "charitable" functions.
The problem the Garcia Court had with the historical approach of
determining what type of behavior falls within a defined group of activi-
ties was that it "prevents a court from accommodating changes in ...
194. Lewiston v. Marcotte Congregate Housing, Inc., 673 A.2d 209, 211-12 (Me. 1996).
195. See Camps Newfound/Owatonna, Inc., 117 S. Ct. at 1610 n.1 (Scalia, J., joined by
Rehnquist, C.J., Ginsburg, J., and Thomas, J., dissenting).
196. See id. at 1610.
197. See id.
198. See id.
199. Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Authority, 469 U.S. 528, 546-47 (1985).
200. See id. at 543-47.
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historical functions . . .,"" Such an appraisal is likely to suffer from
"historical nearsightedness; today's self-evidently [member activity] is
often yesterday's suspect innovation."2 °2 In the case of the "charity" def-
inition given in Camps Newfound/Owatonna, this same predicament
would arise. The judiciary would be faced with the futile task of
attempting to determine whether an activity purporting to assist a person
"to establish themselves in life"203 was an actual means of providing
charitable benefits. Decisions based upon a hard-line interpretation of
"historical" functions would inevitably result in an organization experi-
menting with a recent welfare innovation unfairly being found not to be
engaged in a charitable activity. Alternatively, a group whose work was
once arguably benevolent might be eligible for an undeserved exclusion
from Dormant Commerce Clause scrutiny due to judicial ignorance. In
the words of the Garcia Court, this is "line-drawing of the most arbitrary
sort." 2"
Any nonhistorical model employed to ascertain whether an activity
is charitable would also be deficient. In Garcia, the Court acknowledged
that attempting to identify "traditional governmental functions" based
upon a standard of "unique" or "necessary" services would be even
more unwieldy than simply speculating which activities are "tradi-
tional."2 5 That having been said, one of the presumed limitations of the
charitable exemption was the Maine Supreme Judicial Court's insistence
that any organization receiving the tax benefit "bring its claim unmistak-
ably within the spirit and intent of the act creating the exemption. 20 6
The determination of whether an institution's activities are motivated by
the proper "spirit and intent" of "charity" would seem to be no more
reasonable than attempting to discern whether a "traditional governmen-
tal function" is "unique" or "necessary." All the Court would be doing
is trading one unmanageable standard for another, a practice renounced
in Garcia.
Finally, the creation of an exception to the Dormant Commerce
Clause based upon judicial determination of what constitutes a benevo-
lent act would not be "faithful to the role of federalism in a democratic
society. '207 Garcia rejected any rule establishing the constitutionality of
201. Id. at 543.
202. Id. at 544 n.9.
203. Lewiston v. Marcotte Congregate Housing, Inc., 673 A.2d 209, 211 (Me. 1996).
204. Garcia, 469 U.S. at 544.
205. See id. at 545.
206. Camps Newfound/Owatonna, Inc. v. Town of Harrison, Maine, 117 S. Ct. 1590, 1609
(1997) (Scalia, J., joined by Rehnquist, C.J., Ginsburg, J., and Thomas, J., dissenting)(quoting
Lewiston v. Marcotte Congregate Housing, Inc., 673 A.2d 209, 211 (Me. 1996)).
207. Garcia, 469 U.S. at 546.
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a state action which turned on whether the Court believed an activity
was "traditional" or "necessary" because such an inquiry "inevitably
invites an unelected federal judiciary to make decisions about which
state policies it favors and which ones it dislikes. 2 °8 The determination
of whether an act was "charitable" would plainly implicate the same
concerns. Judicial officers, with their unavoidable biases and disparate
life experiences, would be placed in the unabridged position of being
able to reject the public's opinion of what constitutes charity and imple-
ment their own interpretation. What is ironic about this is that Scalia has
long contended that Dormant Commerce Clause jurisprudence places the
Court in an illegitimate legislative position." 9 By requiring the judici-
ary to determine whether an activity is charitable, however, Scalia's pro-
posed exception actually encourages such a role.
C. A Further Muddying of the Waters
Assuming the Dissent's would-be limitation was not precluded by
sensible precedent, there is still another basis for rejecting such a crea-
tion-practicality. As was discussed in Part III, on its best days the Dor-
mant Commerce Clause is a bewildering doctrine with inconsistently
applied principles. 210 Russell Chapin believes that "[negative] jurispru-
dence, unlike legislation that provides clear guidance for the future, can-
not be harmonized and provides no bright-line test that the states can
follow in framing their regulations. ' 211 Even the staunchest supporters
of the rule have acknowledged its confused condition. Regan, for exam-
ple, has conceded that there tends to be a "discrepancy between word
and deed. ' 21 2 In light of this incongruity, it would hardly seem wise to
add yet another ingredient to the "cloudy waters" 213 of the Dormant
Commerce Clause. The Court has proven in the past that such supple-
ments, rather than clarifying the doctrine, instead tend to provide an
incentive for each Justice to follow his or her own personal agenda.21 4
The split Court in Camps NewfoundlOwatonna is a prime example of
this phenomenon. The Dissent was able to vindicate the charitable tax
exemption regardless of how the statute was characterized, while the
208. Id.
209. See, e.g., American Trucking Ass'ns, Inc. v. Smith, 496 U.S. 167, 200-205 (1990) (Scalia,
J. concurring) ("[Our exercise of the 'negative' Commerce Clause function has ultimately cast us
in [an] essentially legislative role . . . I believe that this jurisprudence takes us, self-consciously
and avowedly, beyond the judicial role itself").
210. See supra notes 91-117 and accompanying text.
211. Chapin, supra note 92, at 181.
212. Regan, supra note 37, at 1284.
213. Wardair Canada, Inc. v. Florida Dept. of Revenue, 477 U.S. 1, 17 (1986) (Burger, C.J.,
concurring in part and concurring in judgment).
214. See supra notes 91-117 and accompanying text.
[Vol. 53:333
THE PROPOSED DOMESTIC CHARITY EXCEPTION
Majority could not despite using supposedly the same criteria.215
Accordingly, while the Maine initiative may have unjustly been deemed
unconstitutional,21 6 that mistake alone cannot substantiate the creation of
an entirely new exception. Before being given another shiny judicial toy,
the Court should be required to demonstrate it can play consistently with
the ones it already has.
VI. CONCLUSION
Ultimately, Camps NewfoundlOwatonna is testament to a Court
which managed to lose sight of the purposes animating Dormant Com-
merce Clause jurisprudence in its haste to reach a sensible decision. The
Majority deemed the charitable tax exemption unconstitutional because
precedent allowed for such a result, not because the statute truly impli-
cated the type of "economic Balkanization" 217 that plagued our nation in
its formative years and which the Founding Fathers and Chief Justice
Marshall sought to eliminate. The Dissent took a more pragmatic
approach when it recognized that the exemption had little to do with
commercial protectionism, but then obtusely advocated the creation of
an unworkable exception to the doctrine. The unfortunate victims of this
impasse are the deserving welfare recipients of the State of Maine.
What the two sides should have done was work together. While the
Majority was correct in insisting that the Court limit the instruments of
its judicial dissection to the Dormant Commerce Clause principles that
had previously been laid down, the Dissent was also correct in question-
ing whether the noble ideals supporting those tenets were truly trans-
gressed by the Maine statute. The position of the Majority promotes
doctrinal predictability, while the view of the Dissent ensures material-
ity. If the two respective approaches had been combined, as they should
always be, it seems likely that the charitable tax exemption would have
been upheld by the Court. A potentially boundless "Domestic Charity"
exception would do nothing to promote such a consensus, and as such
would be an unnecessary and unwelcome addition to the Dormant Com-
merce Clause family.
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215. See supra notes 131-59 and accompanying text.
216. See supra notes 165-88 and accompanying text.
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